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STATEMENT 01 JURISDICT1 , I I 
The risdiction of the Court of Appeals is based on 
the provisions «u-J III (" „, ''/i"U Aif I l! •" |l < |) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1 Did the court below err in refusing to admit parol 
t r y i, i l l i ill I in t i ' i j d i in i II in iiiiii I II III I i n mi I n 1,1 ( ill in in i II II i " I i n " " 
circumstances surrounding it, and the course of dealing of 
the parties? (Preserved below, II"'" I III.I 114) 
.'""•' Standard I ii| i| IP I lato review; The: 
determination of whether allow > ^* idence is a 
question pears v- . : * :ali 
2002) , which WXJ-J. be reviewed for thout 
deference to l:he trial four I f s conclusion Tiivh ir Fire 
I n s u x a m e hi A I 1in»J11 y <t , II II I II I  I , 11 II 1 1 1 Il j | 1 1 1 1 II 
Uicl the court below err in concluding that even 
though it was Cantamar' s agent who fa i led to fulfill *-u^ 
c o n d i 1 II in in I in in P I "i* >rlf*n t „ C a n t dinna i* wfi ,< r i UP v o r I11 UP 1 e R ;r,i i »n t i l l en*I 1 
disregard the condition and enforce the full amount of the 
Note against jerendants? (I reservoil I Il mi 
Standard of af pellate review. J.&ICS eiibuu V^ J. 
the failure of the condition precedent i s a question ~ " 
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Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council, Inc., 976 P.2d 1213, 
1217 (Utah 1999), which will be reviewed for correctness. 
Birch, supra. 
3. Did the court below err in concluding that the Note 
is an integrated agreement as a matter of law, despite the 
fact that it was only one of at least 8 writings? 
(Preserved below at R. 103-110) 
Standard of Review: The determination as to 
whether or not a writing is integrated is a question of 
fact, not law. Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 
266, 270 (Utah 1972). The court's conclusion that there 
were no genuine issues of material fact should be reviewed 
for correctness as set forth in issue no. 9 below. 
4. Did the court below err in concluding that the Note 
is unambiguous as a matter of law? (Preserved below at R. 
109-110) . 
Standard of review: Whether ambiguity exists 
in a contract is a question of law, WebBank v. American 
General Annuity Service Corp., 54 P.3d 1139, 1145 (Utah 
2002), which will be reviewed for correctness. Birch, supra. 
5. Did the court below err in granting summary 
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judgment despite factual * sgations of fraud -... ~..^  
inducement of the Note? (Preserved below at R 113-114) 
r
"i t a i i d f i in t II i l l mi mi»w i n i j i I ' n i i P f , i p l a f in in 11 ( II i II 
are issues of fact Hi i In h y Bank foi ("tuijn mi ill11 i v e s v. 
M e l b o s , b U < 1 11 . 111 1111 I  II, 11 1 1 I 1111 II II II in f* c o n r I. i> 
conclusion that there were no genuine issues of material. 
should be reviewed for correctness dis set forth in 
JLSSUfe I -
g. Did -the court below err in concluding as a matter 
of law that default and compounded interest charges 
ave* 
penalty,, but rather repit.ji in Il il  & reasonable estimation of 
actual damages? (Preserved below at I*1 I Mi 118) 
S t a n d a r d 111 in in i iii Whetheii i iiiiiit iiiiii I i lifii i njcj«h 
s o n a b l e e s t i m a t i o n s o± aotua.ll ulaiiicjnjes i, fi q u e s t i IIIIII 
II II ..it , I Woodhetven j^pa^rf:menf:s t pg ;a shing . . , 
921-922 (Utah 1997). The court's conclu^xwu ^I^L. there were 
~i genuine ~f material fact should be reviewed for 
mi i > ' » " I- J " I I I | 1 1 1 | 1 1 1 1 1 I «, / in 1 1 1 1 1 1 I in 1 1 1 I i ii ^ . . ^  . 
Jid the court beJunii LII XH uuiiulu i^ -^ a matter 
oi ia* I the Note should not be reformed*5 iT*—served 
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below at R. 267-270) 
Standard of review: Whether a contract should 
be reformed presents issues of fact. Katzenberger v. 
State, 735 P.2d 405, 408 (Utah App. 1987). The court's 
conclusion that there were no genuine issues of material 
fact should be reviewed for correctness as set forth in 
issue no. 9 below. 
8. Did the court below err in awarding attorney's fees 
and costs to Cantamar for enforcing the Note, despite the 
fact that Cantamar is in violation of an oral agreement not 
to enforce the Note? (Preserved below at R. 270-272) 
Standard of appellate review: Whether or not 
to grant attorney's fees under a contract is a question of 
law, Ml Vida. Enterprises v. Steen-Adams, 122 P. 3d 144, 147 
(Utah App. 2005), which will be reviewed for correctness. 
Birch, supra. 
9. Did the court below err in concluding that there 
were no genuine issues of material fact and that summary 
judgment was appropriate as a matter of law? (Preserved 
below at R. 60-67; 103-114). 
Standard of appellate review: On review of 
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summary judgment, the appellate court reviews the trial 
court's determinations of no genuine issue of material fact 
for correctness, without granting any deference. Woodbury 
Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 73 P.3d 362, 364 (Utah 
2003). In doing so, the appellate court employs the same 
standard as the trial court; that is, it views facts and 
inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing 
summary judgment. Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 
(Utah 1977); English v. Klenke, 774 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Utah 
App. 1989). If the appellate court's review indicates that 
a genuine issue of material fact exists, summary judgment 
will be overturned and the case remanded for further 
proceedings. English, supra, 11A P.2d at 1156. If not, the 
appellate court will review the trial court's conclusions of 
law for correctness. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC. 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is 
determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the 
appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a breach of contract case. The complaint was 
filed by Plaintiff, The Cantamar, LLC ("Cantamar") against 
the Defendants, Data Systems International, Inc., Carlton J. 
Champagne, and Lon E. Williams (hereinafter collectively 
"DSI") on or about January 9, 2003. A summary judgment 
motion was filed by Cantamar on or about June 16, 2003. 
That motion was denied, without prejudice, on May 6, 2004. 
Following additional discovery, a renewed motion for summary 
judgment was filed by Cantamar on or about May 3, 2005. The 
renewed motion was granted at a hearing held on July 7, 
2005, and summary judgment entered on September 6, 2005. 
Notice of Appeal was filed on September 7, 2005. Defendant 
Lon E. Williams filed a voluntary petition for relief under 
Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code on October 
14, 2005, commencing Bankruptcy No. 05-39013 in the United 
States Bankruptcy Court, District of Utah. 
Following is a statement of facts relevant to the 
appeal: 
1. In the spring of 2000, Carl Champagne, the 
president of DSI, was introduced to a loan and investment 
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broker named Troy Thuett, (Affidavit of Carl Champagne 
("Champagne Aff."), III, 5; R. 61). 
2. Thuett assured DSI that he could obtain a 
$15,000,000 investment for DSI (the "Investment"). (Id., 
16; R. 61). 
3. Starting in 2000, Thuett began lending money to 
DSI. In making the loans, Thuett represented three 
different entities: Covenant Funding Group, Commercial 
Lending Group, Inc., and Cantamar. (Id., 110; R. 61-62). 
4. The first loan was made in the summer of 2000, in 
the amount of $10,000, to pay a broker fee. There was a 
written promissory note for $10,000, but DSI has not been 
able to locate a copy of that note. Prior to borrowing this 
money, DSI expressly agreed with Mr. Thuett that repayment 
would only be made from proceeds of an Investment obtained 
by him. (Id., Ill; R. 62). 
5. When the Investment did not occur by the spring of 
2001, a second loan was made. It was a line of credit in 
the amount of $220,000. The prior $10,000 loan was rolled 
into the line of credit, and cash advances were made in 
March 2001, in the amounts of $44,700 and $66,850. These 
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cash advances were used for operations, loan broker fees, 
and interest payments on the loans. (Id., 512; R. 62). 
6. The interest rate stated in the $220,000 note was 
72%. (R. 70) . 
7. Although evidenced by a promissory note, the line 
of credit for $220,000 was not intended to represent an 
obligation in the amount of $220,000. Rather, it expressed 
a willingness to lend DSI up to that amount. As with the 
other loans, it was subject to the verbal agreement that no 
repayment would be due unless and until an Investment were 
obtained by Thuett. (Id., 513; R. 62). 
8. During the summer of 2001, Thuett was working on 
obtaining a $1,500,000 Letter of Credit for DSI to 
facilitate obtaining the Investment. The parties agreed 
that upon obtaining the Letter of Credit, Thuett would be 
paid $175,000, and would be given 200,000 option shares in 
DSI. The parties executed an Agent Agreement and Contract 
at this time, reflecting their relationship and the goal of 
obtaining the Letter of Credit and the Investment. (Id., 
514; R. 63). 
9. DSI signed a promissory note reflecting the 
-8-
potential obligation to pay a fee of $175,000. The note was 
conditioned on Thuett obtaining the Letter of Credit. The 
verbal agreement of the parties was that the note would only 
be enforceable if and when a $1,500,000 Letter of Credit was 
issued. The Letter of Credit was never obtained. No claim 
has been made that the amount shown on the $175,000 note is 
an obligation of DSI, and no effort to enforce that note has 
been made. (Id., fl5; R. 63). 
10. The interest rate stated in the $175,000 note was 
35%. (R. 76) . 
11. During the summer of 2001, Thuett made two 
additional cash advances to DSI: an advance of $70,000 on 
June 1, 2001, and an advance of $40,896.00 on July 31, 2001. 
To memorialize these advances, another promissory note was 
created, in the amount of $115,000.00. The money from these 
two advances was used to make interest payments on the 
loans, for broker fees and for DSI's operations. (Id., 116; 
R. 63) . 
12. The interest rate stated in the $115,000 note was 
60% until due, and 120% thereafter. (R. 80). 
13. The next loan occurred in the fall of 2001, when 
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Thuett lent DSI $15,000 to make interest payments on the 
prior loans. (Id., 117; R. 64). 
14. The interest rate stated in the $15,000 note was 
60% until due, and 120% thereafter. (R. 84). 
15. In January, 2002, another loan to pay interest on 
prior loans was made, also in the amount of $15,000. (Id., 
118; R. 64). 
16. The interest rate stated in the second $15,000 
note was no interest until due, and 30% thereafter. (R. 88). 
17. The last loan was made in January, 2002, in the 
amount of $269,285.07. A promissory note (the "Note") for 
this loan was signed. (A copy of the Note is included in 
the Addendum). Along with the Note, DSI gave Mr. Thuett an 
option to buy stock in DSI. (Id., 519; R. 92-96). 
18. The interest rate stated in the Note was 8% until 
due, and 30% thereafter. (R. 92). 
19. The Note did not include any cash advances to DSI. 
It was nothing more than a consolidation of all prior loans. 
Mr. Thuett prepared a ledger showing how he arrived at the 
principal balance for the Note. The ledger appears to 
accurately reflect loans and interest payments. (Id., 520; 
-10-
R. 98-99). 
20. From 2000 to 2002, Thuett and the representatives 
of DSI often discussed DSIf s financial situation and the 
need for the Investment. Mr. Thuett would question DSI's 
representatives about DSI's money needs and then offer to 
make loans to DSI. He offered the loans to DSI in order to 
make the interest payments on prior loans and because he 
kept assuring DSI that the Investment was imminent. (Id. , 
1122 and 23; R. 65). 
21. Each time a loan was made, DSI's representatives 
stressed to Mr. Thuett, and he agreed, that DSI would not be 
able to re-pay the loan until the Investment was made to 
DSI. That understanding was a critical component of each of 
the loans, since DSI knew and Mr. Thuett knew that DSI did 
not have any other source for re-paying the loans. (Id., 
124; R. 65). 
22. With regard to the interest rates stated in the 
notes, DSI agreed to pay those rates only on condition that 
an Investment were to be obtained from which the interest 
could be paid. (Deposition of Carl Champagne, July 13, 
2004, at 53; R. 218) . 
-11-
23. DSI would not have accepted any of the loans, or 
signed any of the promissory notes, without two explicit 
assurances from Mr. Thuett in connection with each loan: 
first, that the loan could not and would not be repaid until 
the Investment was made; and second, that an Investment was 
imminent. (Champagne Aff., 225; R. 65). 
24. On January 11, 2002, DSI's representatives met 
with Mr. Thuett in his office. Those present at the meeting 
were Carl Champagne, Lon Williams and Brian Bingel of DSI, 
and Mr. Thuett. He prepared the Note while they were there. 
They received no legal or financial advice regarding the 
Note. During the meeting, DSI's representatives 
specifically agreed with Mr. Thuett that the Note would not 
be repaid, except from the proceeds of an Investment that 
Mr. Thuett would obtain for DSI. He again assured DSI that 
the Investment was imminent. (Id., 126; R. 66). 
25. There was no discussion or agreement, either 
during the meeting on January 11, 2002, or at any other 
time, to the effect that the Note was intended as a final or 
complete expression of DSI's agreements with Mr. Thuett and 
his companies. To the contrary, it was understood by all 
-12-
present at the meeting that the business affairs of DSI and 
Thuett and his companies were incomplete, and that future 
work, performance and agreements would be required on both 
sides before completion of the business relationship. 
Specifically, all agreed and understood that only the 
successful closing of an Investment would allow the parties 
to complete the deal. (Id., 528; R. 66). 
26. The gist of DSI's ongoing agreement with Mr. 
Thuett was as follows: if DSI would allow Thuett and his 
companies to continue acting as DSI's broker, Thuett would 
find an Investment for DSI, and in the meantime would 
advance money to keep DSI viable; DSI would only re-pay the 
advances (and the broker fee) from an Investment obtained 
for DSI by Thuett. (Id., 229; R. 67). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The court below excluded parol evidence of an oral 
agreement conditioning repayment of the Note on obtaining an 
Investment. The exclusion of evidence was erroneous. The 
parol evidence rule only applies to integrated agreements 
and the Note is not an integrated agreement. The parol 
evidence rule only applies to unambiguous agreements and the 
-13-
Note is ambiguous. The parol evidence rule does not bar 
evidence of fraud, mistake or condition precedent. Even if 
the evidence was properly excluded, which it was not, there 
are genuine issues of material fact relating to whether the 
interest charged in the Note is an unenforceable penalty. 
Finally, Cantamar is not entitled to attorney's fees because 
Cantamar itself is in breach of the oral agreement to obtain 
an Investment prior to enforcing the Note. For all the 
foregoing reasons, summary judgment should be reversed and 
the case remanded for trial. 
ARGUMENT 
;
 I, : 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT BELOW 
TO CONCLUDE AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT 
THE NOTE WAS AN INTEGRATED CONTRACT 
The court below concluded as a matter of law that the 
Note was an integrated agreement. (See Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Plaintiffs Renewed 
Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter the "Findings and 
Conclusions"), at 5, 15; R. 465-470; a copy of the Findings 
and Conclusions is included in the Addendum) . This was 
error. The determination as to whether or not a writing is 
-14-
integrated is a question of fact, not law. Bullfrog Marina, 
Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (Utah 1972); accord, 
Novel" nc. v. The Canopy Group, Inc., 92 P.3d 768, 772 
(Utah App. 2004) . 
The fact question to be answered is "whether the 
parties did in fact adopt a particular writing or writings 
as the final and complete expression of their bargain." 
Bullfrog Marina, supra, 501 P.2d at 270 (emphasis added). 
To protect the integrity of written agreements, there 
is a rebuttable presumption that a writing which on its face 
appears integrated is, in fact, integrated. Union Bank s 
Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985). 
In its Findings and Conclusions, the court below 
identified those aspects of the Note tending" to show that, 
on its face, it appears to be an integrated agreement. 
(Findings and Conclusions, at 5, f4). Other aspects of the 
Note, ignored by the court below, are inconsistent with 
integration: for example, there is no integration clause in 
the Note There is > mutual release. There is no 
statement indicating disposition of all claims. 
The court below disregarded those aspects of the Note 
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inconsistent with integration, and found integration as a 
matter of law. Id. In doing so, the court also disregarded 
the principle that any presumption of integration arising 
from the face of the Note is rebuttable. Union Bank, supra. 
On appeal from summary judgment, a rebuttable 
presumption is overcome if the court concludes, after 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment, that there is a genuine 
issue of material fact. Genzmer v. Public Health Trust of 
Mlaml-Dade County, 219 F.Supp.2d 1275, 1279-1280 (S.D. Fla. 
2002); Cansler v. Mills, 765 N.E.2d 698, 705-707 (Ind. 
App. 2002). Stated differently, summary judgment in favor 
of a rebuttable presumption should be reversed if sufficient 
evidence has been submitted so that a reasonable trier of 
fact could find against the presumption. Singh v. Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., 308 F.3d 25, 32 
(1st Cir. 2002) . 
Although there are no Utah cases on the question of the 
sufficiency of evidence needed to overcome a rebuttable 
presumption on summary judgment, there is Utah law 
consistent with the standard set forth above. Describing 
-16-
the legal effect of a rebuttable presumption in an 
employment case, the Utah Supreme Court said: 
To rebut is to overcome, to contradict, to 
persuade or convince to the contrary. ... Since 
the employer must produce sufficient evidence to 
overcome the presumption of negligence, of course 
the jury must weigh the evidence in the light and 
against the force of the presumption, to determine 
whether it has been outweighed or overcome. 
Buhler v. Maddison, 176 P.2d 118, 124 (Utah 1947). 
In the present case, there was ample evidence to rebut, 
for purposes of summary judgment, any presumption of 
integration adhering to the Note. (See, generally, 
Statement of the Case, supra, 551 through 26). The Note was 
only one of seven notes. (See Champagne Aff., Exhibits A, 
C, D, E, F and G, R. 69-94). At the time each of the seven 
notes was signed, the parties agreed that no repayment Mould 
be made unless and until an Investment were first obtained. 
(R. 65) This agreement was a critical part of the ongoing 
business relationship between Thuett and his companies 
DSI, because all were aware that without an Investment there 
would be no way to repay the loans, (M 65) Without the 
agreement conditioning repayment, DSI would not have 
accepted the loans or signed the notes. (R. 65). 
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In addition to the notes, the parties entered into a 
written Agent Agreement and Contract. This agreement 
expressed in writing the ongoing condition precedent: 
CLG has loaned DSI other bridge funds for 
operating capital and interim capital needs. It 
is the intent of DSI to pay all loans and interest 
in full upon the funding of the WAFI loan. 
Agent Agreement and Contract, attached to Champagne Aff. as 
Exhibit B, R. 74 (emphasis added). 
The last promissory note in the series was the Note. 
(R. 64). The Note did not include any actual money or new 
value. (R. 64). It was simply a rollover of the prior 
notes. (R. 64) The same agreement was made when the Note 
was issued as had been made in connection with all the prior 
notes: there would be no repayment unless and until an 
Investment were to be obtained. (R. 66). 
At the time the Note was signed, it was understood by 
the parties to it that their business affairs were 
incomplete, that substantial future work and further 
agreements would be necessary, and that only the successful 
closing of an Investment would allow the parties to complete 
their deal. (R. 66). 
The foregoing evidence is sufficient to rebut the 
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presumption of integration because it raises a genuine issue 
of fact as to whether the Note expressed the complete 
agreement of the parties, or only a part of ll "Where paxoJ 
evidence shows that the writing in question expresses only 
part of the agreement, courts refuse to find integration. 
Bullfrog Marina, supra, 501 P.2d at 271-272; accord, 
Magelsen v. Farnworth, 2005 WL 914186 (Utah App, 2005) 
("the written contract [is] one piece of the parties' 
ongoing and evolving agreement rather than ... the *final 
and complete' expression of their intent") (emphasis added) 
(a c £ the Magelsen case is included in the Addendum) . 
Cases finding integration tend to follow a fact pattern 
different from that in the present case. For example, in 
Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomqulst, 773 
P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989), the progression of events followed a 
pattern leading to an integrated agreement: a course of 
business dealings, followed by disputes, followed by 
negotiations, followed by a comprehensive settlement 
agreement. 773 P.2d at 1383-1384. As the Utah Supreme 
Court observed: 
The settlement agreement of January 24, 1983, 
deals in a comprehensive fashion with the 
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relationship ... This indicates that the parties' 
whole agreement is contained in the document. 
Id. at 1385 (emphasis added) ; accord, Terry's Sales, Inc. v. 
Vander Veur, 618 P. 2d 29, 32 (Utah 1980) 
A similar fact pattern-dispute, negotiation, then 
settlement—appears in Novell, Inc. v. The Canopy Group, 
92 P.3d 768 (Utah App. 2004). In Novell, the parties 
negotiated in detail regarding the amount and method for 
calculating royalties. Id. at 770. Following those 
negotiations, the parties entered into a written agreement 
that spelled out their agreement on that precise point. Id. 
For that reason, that subject was closed to parol evidence: 
Canopy's evidence clearly shows the parties 
participated in prolonged negotiations to settle 
their disagreements regarding the deductions and 
Novell's overall percentage. ... [R]egardless of 
whether the parties may have had preliminary 
agreements about a given subject during the course 
of negotiations, we will assume that a writing 
dealing with the same subject was intended by the 
parties to supercede any prior or contemporaneous 
agreements. [cites omitted] 
Novell, supra, 92 P.3d at 772 (underlined emphasis added; 
italicized emphasis in the original). 
It makes sense to bar parol evidence where extensive 
negotiations over a defined subject matter produce specific 
agreement on that point. Allowing parol evidence of claimed 
-20-
inconsistent oral agreements in such a setting would 
undermine the parties' efforts and cheapen the value of 
written agreements. The Novell case provides a striking 
example of this concern: 
There is no dispute that earlier drafts of the 
License Agreement included a deduction for 
litigation expenses in the definition of the term 
"Royalty Base7'. There is also no dispute that at 
the six-hour "marathon" closing, after several 
drafts of the agreement were proposed and 
discarded, the litigation expense deduction was 
removed. 
Novell, supra, 94 P.3d at 774 (emphasis added) 
In other words, the "oral agreement'' Canopy was arguing 
for in litigation had been proposed by Canopy (perhaps more 
than once) in its extensive negotiations with Novell, but 
had never been accepted by Novell; and at the final 
negotiating session was dropped by Canopy. It would be 
wrong to allow Canopy to impose in litigation a contract 
term that Novell had never agreed to in negotiations. 
In contrast, cases refusing to find integration feature 
a fact pattern inconsistent with the notion of a complete 
and final agreement. These cases tend to reflect more 
elastic business relationships, ongoing or evolving deals, 
or multiple written agreements, each covering only a part of 
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the whole. See, e.g., Bullfrog Marina, supra; MageIsen 
v. Farnworth, supra; and Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 746-
747 (Utah 2002). 
The fact pattern in the present case fits with those 
cases refusing to find integration. The business 
relationships were ongoing and evolving. The loans to DSI 
were only a part of the business relationship. The Note was 
only one of 8 written agreements, each covering only a part 
of the deal. The language of the Note is limited rather 
than comprehensive. The Note was not the product of careful 
negotiation, but instead was a form agreement generated by 
Mr. Thuett while DSI's representatives sat in his office. 
(R. 66) The agreement that payment was to be made only if 
and when an investment occurred was not just a proposal or a 
negotiating point but instead was agreed on by both parties 
as a necessary element of the ongoing business relationship. 
(R. 65-67). 
In these circumstances, summary judgment was erroneous 
because it focused solely on the Note, disregarded 
everything else, and imposed an agreement not contemplated 
by the parties and unfair to DSI. 
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II. 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
THE ISSUE OF AMBIGUITY 
The court below concluded that the Note was 
unambiguous. (Findings and Conclusions, at 4, 53). Based 
on that conclusion, and its finding that the Note was 
integrated, the court below refused to consider DSI's parol 
evidence and granted summary judgment. Id., at 6. 
Whether ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of 
law. WebBank v. American General Annuity Service Corp. , 54 
P.3d 1139, 1145 (Utah 2002). As will be shown below, the 
trial court's legal conclusion that the Note is unambiguous 
was erroneous, and there are genuine issues of fact in 
dispute as to the intended meaning the Note. 
A. The Doctrine of Practical Construction 
Utah adheres to the doctrine of practical construction, 
explained as follows: 
Where the parties have demonstrated by their 
actions and performance that to them the contract 
meant something quite different, the meaning and 
intent of the parties should be enforced. In such 
a situation, the parties by their actions have 
created the ambiguity to bring the rule into 
operation. If this were not the case, the courts 
would be enforcing one contract when both parties 
-23-
have demonstrated that they meant and intended to 
[sic] the contract to be quite different. 
Bullfrog Marina., supra, 501 P.2d at 271 (emphasis added) / 
accord, Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P.2d 85, 90 (Utah 
1975), and cases cited therein. 
The doctrine of practical construction is consistent 
with Utah case law holding that parol evidence must be 
considered in determining whether or not a writing is 
ambiguous. Ward v. Intermountaln Farmers Association, 907 
P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995); accord, Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 
78 P.3d 600, 601 (Utah 2003). 
In the present case, the actions and performance of the 
parties established at least two areas of ambiguity: first, 
the due dates on the notes were unimportant; and second, 
although the notes were unconditional in form, in practice 
they were conditional. 
With regard to due dates on the notes: None of the 
prior notes' due dates was enforced or even discussed. When 
the parties met to sign new notes, the focus of the 
discussions between them was not on repayment, but rather on 
reassurances that an Investment was imminent. (R. 61, 65-
66) This was explained by Carl Champagne in his deposition: 




Q. Why didn't that trouble you? 
I Because of all the other foolishness that we 
were doing with all these other notes rolling them 
over. There was a pattern of when it becomes due, 
just roll them over, and I'm saying it doesn't 
bother me, you get the investment, Troy, we'll pay 
this. 
Q. So you recognized that there was a due date on 
the note; you just anticipated it would be rolled 
over again? 
A. Uh-huh. If he didn't get the investment, it's 
going to be rolled, just understanding here we're 
not paying any of this. 
Deposition of Carl Champagne, at 67-68; R. 225-226 
(emphasis added). 
With regard to the conditional nature of the notes: In 
this series of documents there were two other promissory 
notes that (like the Note) appeared to be unconditional 
payment obligations but were not. The first such note was 
signed on or about March 1, 2001, in the amount of 
$220,000.00. (R. 70-72) Although in the form of a 
omissory note, the $220,000 note was really a line of 
credit. (R. 62) On the day it was signed, not more than 
$144,261.50 had been advanced to DSI. (R. 62) 
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The second such note was signed on or about May 16, 
2001, in the amount of $175,000. Although the language of 
the $175,000 note indicated a present obligation in that 
amount, the actual intent of the parties was to promise a 
potential commission. The commission would be owing only if 
and when a Letter of Credit were issued to DSI in the amount 
of $1,500,000. (R. 63). The Letter of Credit was never 
issued. (R. 63). No claim has been made that the $175,000 
note is an enforceable obligation of DSI, and no effort has 
been made to collect it. (R. 63) 
When the Note was prepared to reflect the balance owing 
on all prior loans, neither the $220,000 note nor the 
$175,000 note were included in the payoff calculation. (R. 
98-99). The absence of these notes from the payoff 
calculation is evidence that they were not intended as 
enforceable obligations. 
The $220,000 note, the $175,000 note and the Note were 
all part of the ongoing business relationship between Mr. 
Thuett and DSI. Although nominally promissory notes, none 
of the three was intended to function as a note. Rather, 
they were potential obligations, subject to conditions that, 
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though unstated in the body of each note, were understood 
and agreed upon by the parties. 
Evidence of the course of dealings between the parties 
is admissible to show whether a written agreement is 
integrated. Ele v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 
1195 (Utah 1981). 
In the present case, interpreting the Note without 
reference to the course of dealing would work an injustice 
on DSI. Mr. Thuett made the loans to DSI, not as a lender 
whose business is making loans and collecting them with 
interest, but rather a* broker interested in keeping a 
client going in order to realize a much larger return. That 
return would consist first of a substantial commission (and 
repayment of the loans) upon the closing of an Investment, 
and second of an equity position in DSI. Because he 
believed an Investment was imminent, and because he wanted 
the larger return, Mr. Thuett readily agreed that the loans 
would be repayable only from the proceeds of the Investment. 
B. The Character of the Note is Ambiguous 
In the court below, Cantamar asserted that the language 
of the Note is clear and unambiguous regarding its maturity 
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date. (See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Support of its Renewed Summary Judgment, at 2; R. 201). 
Cantamar then argued that because the "four corners of the 
agreement" appear to be complete and unambiguous, parol 
evidence is not permitted. (Id., at 3; R. 202) 
Cantamar's argument ignores the requirement, set forth 
by the Utah Supreme Court in the Ward case, that parol 
evidence must be considered in deciding whether a writing is 
ambiguous. Ward, supra, 907 P.2d at 268 ("[when determining 
whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must 
be considered"). 
Cantamar's argument also ignores the seminal case of 
Colonial Leasing Company of New England, Inc. v. Larsen 
Brothers Construction Co., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). In 
Colonial Leasing, plaintiff financed defendant's acquisition 
of heavy equipment through a written agreement labeled as a 
"lease". 731 P.2d at 484. The "lease" contained an 
integration clause and expressly required return of the 
equipment at the end of the lease. Id. at 485. 
Despite the lack of ambiguity in the language of the 
"lease" itself, the Utah Supreme Court held that a genuine 
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issue of material fact as to the meaning and purpose of the 
document prevented summary judgment. Id. at 487. It was 
the "character" of the agreement, not its specific wording, 
that was ambiguous: 
It is the general rule that if an agreement is 
ambiguous because of lack of clarity in the meaning 
of particular terms, it is subject to parol 
evidence as to what the parties intended with 
respect to those terms. [Cites omitted] We hold 
that rule also applies where the character of the 
written agreement itself is ambiguous even though 
its specific terms are not ambiguous. 
Colonial Leasing, supra, 731 P.2d at 487 (emphasis added). 
In the present case, even though the maturity date in 
the Note is not ambiguous, the Note as a whole is ambiguous 
because its true character is not fully expressed in the 
language of the Note. In determining the true character of 
a written agreement, evidence of the surrounding 
circumstances and the intent of the parties should be 
considered, as well as the language of the writing itself. 
Id. at 487-488. 
The same rule should be followed in the present case, 
which should be remanded for trial. The court below should 
be instructed to consider evidence of the parties' course of 
dealing, the language and nature of other notes entered into 
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between the parties, and the verbal agreements placing 
conditions on the payment obligation in the Note. After 
considering all the evidence, the court below will be able 
to determine the true character and meaning of the Note. 
III. 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
THE ISSUE OF FRAUD 
DSI pled fraud in the inducement as an affirmative 
defense. (See Answer, at 2, R. 20). Evidence in support 
of the defense was also presented. (See Champagne Aff., 
M22-29; R. 65-67). When Cantamar filed its motion for 
summary judgment, DSI argued fraud as an affirmative defense 
in its memorandum. (See Memorandum in Opposition to Summary 
Judgment, at 14-15, R. 113-114). At oral argument on the 
summary judgment motion, DSI's counsel raised fraud as a 
defense. (Tr. of Hearing May 6, 2004, at 14-16). 
When fraud in the inducement is alleged as a defense to 
a written contract, parol evidence is admissible to prove 
the defense. Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 666 
(Utah 1985). 
The court below initially received DSI's evidence of 
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fraud, but later excluded it. (See Findings and 
Conclusions, at 5, 54) . The basis for excluding the 
evidence was the trial court's conclusion that the Note was 
an integrated agreement. Id. Having excluded DSI's 
evidence, the court below concluded that there was "no 
genuine issue as to any material fact," and based on that 
determination, enter summary judgment. Id., at 6. 
It was error for the court below to exclude DSI's 
evidence, since "[parol evidence is admissible to prove that 
a party was induced into a contract by fraud, despite a 
determination that a writing is an integrated contract." 
Union Bank, supra, 707 P.2d at 666 (emphasis added) . 
If DSI's evidence had not been erroneously excluded, 
summary judgment could not have been granted, since issues 
relating to fraud are issues of fact. Berkeley Bank for 
Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah 1980). 
There is an exception to the general rule just stated. 
In rare circumstances, the issue of "reasonable reliance", 
which is an essential element in a fraud claim, may be 
decided on summary judgment as a matter of law. Gold 
Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Company, 915 P.2d 1060, 1067 
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(Utah 1996). 
In Gold Standard, plaintiff's fraud claim was based on 
a meeting which took place on March 2, 1982. Id. at 1067. 
At that meeting, defendant promised plaintiff that its 25% 
interest would be given back as soon as plaintiff got 
financing. Id. Plaintiff claimed fraud when defendant 
later reneged on that promise. Id. At trial, the jury 
found in favor of plaintiff and awarded substantial damages, 
including punitives. Id. at 1063. 
Unfortunately for the plaintiff in Gold Standard, the 
trial court granted judgment n.o.v., dismissing the fraud 
claim. Id. at 1066. On appeal, the judgment n.o.v. was 
affirmed. Id. at 1069. Affirmance was based on the 
conclusion that plaintiff could not have reasonably relied 
on the promise made at the March 2 meeting: 
While the question of reasonable reliance is 
usually a matter within the province of the jury, 
[cite omitted] there are instances where courts may 
conclude that as a matter of law, there was no 
reasonable reliance. 
Gold Standard, supra, 915 P.2d at 1067. 
The specific facts in Gold Standard brought it within 
the exception, allowing the court to conclude as a matter of 
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law that there was no reasonable reliance. In Gold 
Standard, the promise to restore plaintiffs 25% interest 
was made on March 2. The very next day, March 3, defendant 
sent a letter, which plaintiff received, which directly, 
explicitly, and specifically denied the promise. Id. at 
1067. A second letter was sent on March 12, also denying 
the promise. Id. A third letter was hand delivered to 
plaintiff on March 24, to the same effect. Id. 
In view of these letters, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that plaintiff could not possibly have continued to rely on 
the promise for more than one day, and nothing happened in 
that one day to cause damage to plaintiff. Id. at 1068. 
The facts in the present case are not at all similar to 
those in Gold Standard. In contrast to the immediate and 
repeated disavowal of the promise in Gold Standard, the 
facts in the present case show the opposite pattern: 
repeated reaffirmations of the promise, and never a 
disavowal. (Champagne Aff., 5222-29/ R. 65-67). 
In the court below, Cantamar argued that the Gold 
Standard rule should be applied in the present case, 
asserting that the Note itself was a writing disavowing the 
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oral agreement. (See Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment, at 6-9, R. 131-134). 
This argument is misplaced, however, because the Note 
does not contain any direct, explicit, or specific denial of 
the oral agreement. (See Note in Addendum below) . The 
Note, instead, is silent with regard to the oral agreement, 
and therein lies the difference between a factual issue of 
reasonable reliance and a conclusion as a matter of law, a 
la Gold Standard. 
The facts in the present case are much more closely 
aligned to those in the Union Bank case. In Union Bank, 
supra, the Swensons borrowed money from Union Bank for their 
company, State Lumber, Inc. 707 P.2d at 664. The loan 
documents contained signature lines for State Lumber and for 
the Swensons "individually and personally." Id. They 
signed the loan documents, the loan was made, the company 
defaulted, and the bank sued the Swensons personally. Id. 
As a defense, Swensons claimed that the bank's officers 
had promised them "that their signatures were for 
appearances only and no collection action would be brought 
against them personally." Id. (Emphasis added). 
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The Bank sought to brush aside Swensons' defense, 
arguing that since the loan documents were integrated, 
evidence of the alleged verbal promises was barred by the 
parol evidence rule. Id. The trial court agreed and 
granted summary judgment, which the Supreme Court reversed. 
Id. at 664-665, 669. 
The reasoning for the Court's reversal in Union Bank is 
applicable in the present case. The Court held that the 
Swensons' allegations raised a genuine issue of fraud in the 
inducement, precluding summary judgment. "Parol evidence is 
admissible to prove that a party was induced into a contract 
by fraud, despite a determination that a writing is an 
integrated contract." Id. (Emphasis added). The Court 
quoted the following rule with approval: 
If a parol contemporaneous agreement be the 
inducing cause of the written contract, or forms a 
part of the consideration therefor, and it appears 
the writing was executed on the faith of the parol 
agreement or representation, extrinsic evidence is 
admissible. In such cases, the real basis for its 
admission is to show fraud. 
Union Bank, supra, 707 P.2d at 667, quoting from Bell v. 
Lammon, 179 P.2d 757, 761 (N.M. 1947) (italicized emphasis 
in the original; underlined emphasis added). 
The same rule was followed by the Utah Supreme Court in 
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a second case factually similar to the present case. In 
W.W. and W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Mann, 680 P.2d 23 (Utah 
1984), plaintiff was attempting to enforce a promissory 
note. 680 P.2d at 24. The trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff in spite of the 
defendant's argument that when he signed the note, the 
plaintiff agreed to obtain payment of the note from a 
particular source. Id. On appeal, the plaintiff argued 
that the parol evidence rule barred evidence of the payment 
arrangement. Id. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed, holding 
that fraud is an exception to the parol evidence rule. The 
Court further held that evidence showing that a note was 
taken subject to an agreement for it to be repaid from a 
particular fund stated a claim for fraud sufficient to 
defeat summary judgment. Id. at 24-25. 
The difference between Gold Standard on the one hand 
and Union Bank and Gardner on the other is that in Gold 
Standard the writings directly, explicitly and specifically 
denied the verbal promise, whereas in Union Bank and Gardner 
the notes were silent regarding the verbal promise. 
The rule applied in Union Bank and Gardner should also 
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be applied in the present case. The evidence establishes, 
for summary judgment purposes, that DSI signed the Note in 
reliance on an oral agreement that they would only have to 
repay the Note from the proceeds of an Investment. The Note 
itself was silent with regard to the agreement. For that 
reason, "reasonable reliance" is an issue of fact and 
summary judgment was improper. 
IV. 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
FAILURE OF THE CONDITION PRECEDENT 
MADE THE NOTE DUE AND PAYABLE 
In the court below, there were two hearings on 
Cantamar's summary judgment motion. The first hearing took 
place on May 6, 2004. (Tr., at 1). At the conclusion of 
that hearing, Cantamar's motion for summary judgment was 
denied, without prejudice, largely because of parol evidence 
of a condition precedent. Id., at 23:12 through 24:7. 
The initial ruling of the court below, denying summary 
judgment, was correct because there is substantial parol 
evidence of a condition precedent. Even where a written 
agreement is integrated, the parol evidence rule does not 
bar evidence of a condition precedent. In FMA Financial 
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Corporation v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617 P.2d 327 (Utah 1980), 
defendants were farmers who wanted a corn silo. Id. at 328. 
They offered to buy the silo from a man named Levie. Id. 
Rather than financing the deal himself, Levie contacted FMA. 
Id. FMA arranged to buy the silo from Levie and lease it to 
the defendants. Id. 
When the defendants met with Levie to sign FMA's lease, 
they made the deal conditional on Levie installing the silo 
"by corn harvest time.'7 Id. at 329. Levie failed to set 
the silo up in time and defendants refused to pay for it. 
Id. 
FMA sued the defendants for breach of the lease. Id. 
at 328. FMA argued that the lease was "integrated, clear, 
definite, and unambiguous", and did not require installation 
by "corn harvest time". Id. at 329. Because the written 
agreement contained no time limit for installation, FMA 
argued that testimony of such a limit was barred by the 
parol evidence rule. Id. 
The FMA court observed that the parol evidence rule 
does not bar: 
...proof that a party did not perform an obligation 
which it was understood and agreed by the parties 
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was a condition precedent to the contract becoming 
effective. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The same rule was applied in another Utah case: 
[I]f a written instrument is delivered upon an 
express condition, and is not to be effective until 
the condition is fulfilled, the condition upon 
which it was delivered, ... may be shown by parol. 
Central Bank of Bingham v. Stephens, 199 P. 1018, 1021 
(Utah 1921) (emphasis added). 
The rule applied in FMA and Central Bank should also be 
applied in the present case. The testimony establishes, for 
summary judgment purposes, that the parties understood and 
agreed that only if and when Thuett obtained an Investment 
would the loans be repayable. That condition, like the one 
in FMA, was not written into the agreement. Instead, it 
functioned as a condition precedent to the payment 
obligation in the Note. 
In 2005, Cantamar renewed its motion for summary 
judgment. A hearing on the renewed motion took place on 
July 7, 2005. (Tr. at 32). At the conclusion of the 
second hearing, the motion for summary judgment was granted. 
Id., at 67, lines 4-10. 
In granting summary judgment at the second hearing, the 
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court below did not find or conclude against the existence 
of a condition precedent; instead, the court concluded that 
the condition precedent had failed, and therefore the Note 
was due and payable in full. (Findings and Conclusions, at 
5, 55). 
The conclusion of the court below was erroneous. The 
law in Utah is clear that failure of a condition precedent 
does not result in the obligation becoming immediately due. 
On the contrary, it acts to relieve the obligor of any duty 
to perform: 
Under well-established principles of contract 
interpretation, where the duty of the obligor to 
perform is contingent upon the occurrence or 
existence of a condition precedent, the obligee may 
not require performance by the obligor, because the 
obligor's duty, and conversely the obligee's right 
to demand performance, does not arise until that 
condition occurs or exists, [cite omitted] Failure 
of a material condition precedent relieves the 
obligor of any duty to perform. 
Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council, Inc., 976 P.2d 1213, 
1217 (Utah 1999) (emphasis added). 
Most other courts follow the same rule. See, e.g., 
Dengler v. Hazel Blessinger Family Trust, 106 P.3d 449, 454 
(Idaho 2005) ("When there is a failure of a condition 
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precedent through no fault of the parties, no liability or 
duty to perform arises under the contract") ; Johnson v. 
Coss, 667 N.W.2d 701, 705 (S.D. 2003) ("It is a general 
principle of contract law that failure of a condition 
precedent ... bars enforcement of the contract"); 
Management, Inc. v. Mastersons, Inc., 616 P.2d 356, 360 
(Mont. 1980) ("If the condition is not fulfilled, the right 
to enforce the contract does not come into existence"); 
Golden Heights Land Company, Inc. v. Norman Babel Mortgage 
Company, 102 So.2d 858, 859 (Fla. App. 1958) ("the 
principle is well established that where a particular fund 
from which payments are to be made does not materialize, the 
court is not at liberty to grant a money judgment") ; Scafldl 
v. Johnson, 420 So.2d 1113, 1116 (La. 1982) ("There was a 
condition precedent to Johnson's obligation: that is, 
receipt of dividends, or other distribution of corporate 
funds sufficient to make payment. Since there was 
nonperformance of this condition, Johnson is not liable on 
the note to Scafidi"). 
The present case should be remanded for trial. At 
trial, the court below can make findings based on all the 
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evidence as to whether a condition precedent was in effect 
and if so, whether it has failed. If it has failed, and the 
Note (with its onerous interest rate and due date) is not 
enforceable under contract law, repayment of the loans may 
still be appropriate under equitable principles, on terms 
fair to both sides. 
.: v. 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE 
ISSUE WHETHER THE INTEREST ON THE 
NOTE WAS AN UNENFORCEABLE PENALTY 
Utah7 s courts refuse to enforce liquidated damages 
provisions that amount to penalties. Woodhaven Apartments 
v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1997). 
Any liquidated damages provision that exceeds a 
reasonable estimation of actual damages is an unenforceable 
penalty: 
Damages recoverable under a liquidated damages 
provision in a contract will generally be limited 
to an amount that represents a reasonable 
estimation, at the time the contract was drafted, 
of what would be necessary to compensate the 
nonbreaching party for losses caused by the breach. 
This policy is based on the view that any 
liquidated damages provision not so limited results 
in the imposition of a penalty on the breaching 
party that is not permitted. 
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Reld v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 
1989) (emphasis added). 
Default interest rates in promissory notes are treated 
the same as liquidated damages provisions: 
Labeling a contract term an interest provision does 
not make it so. If, though labeled interest, it 
exacts a penalty or sets liquidated damages in an 
impermissible manner, it will not be enforced. 
In re Kalian, 178 B.R. 308, 313-314 (Bkr. D.R.I. 1995) 
(emphasis added). 
DSI has found only one Utah case deciding whether a 
default interest provision was unenforceable as a penalty. 
In Prudential Capital Group Co. v. Mattson, 802 P.2d 104 
(Utah App. 1990), Mattson leased an airplane. The lease 
called for interest at 24% on all unpaid lease payments. 
Id. at 105. The Court of Appeals upheld the default 
interest provision for the following reasons: 
1. The Court of Appeals was unable to compare actual 
damages against liquidated damages because the trial court 
made no findings and Mattson failed to marshal the evidence 
presented below, Id. at 107; 
2. Mattson had both legal and financial advice, was 
advised by his attorney not to sign the lease, but did it 
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anyway, Id.; and 
3. The liquidated damages ($246,461.69) were not so 
excessive, in view of the full term value of the lease 
($1,279,588.80), as to shock the conscience of the reviewing 
court sufficiently to reverse the lower court. Id. 
The present case is distinguishable from Prudential on 
all three points. First, Cantamar presented no evidence of 
damages other than loss of use of the money, and attorney's 
fees, both of which are separately provided for in the Note. 
DSI, however, did present evidence that there were no other 
damages. (Champagne Aff., 530; R. 67). 
Second, DSI received no advice whatsoever regarding the 
advisability of signing the Note. (Id., 526) 
Finally, and most importantly, the default interest 
amount is disproportional to the loans. The loans 
(including the initial $10,000 loan), totaled $232,446. 
(Champagne Aff., f20, R. 64; Exhibit I, R. 98-99). 
Interest payments totaling $69,528,45 were made between 
March 1, 2001 and January 11, 2002, yet the principal amount 
of the Note was nevertheless increased to $269,285.07. Id. 
This means that interest totaling $106,367.52 (consisting of 
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the $69,528.45 actually paid plus the increase of $36,839 in 
loan principle from $232,446 to $269,285) was charged on the 
loans, an effective annual interest rate of nearly 55% for 
the period of time from March 1, 2001, through January 11, 
2002. Accrued interest was compounded with the principal 
amount of the loans to arrive at the amount of the Note. 
The court below awarded Cantamar the 55% compounded 
interest rate built into the Note. Additional interest in 
the amount of $47,125 through December 11, 2002, was then 
added. Finally, the court required interest to be paid at 
the rate of 30% on the unpaid principle of the Note from and 
after December 11, 2002. (Findings and Conclusions, p.5,17). 
Interest on $269,285 from December 11, 2002, through 
the date of entry of judgment (September 6, 2005) is 
$221,773. The Note amount ($269,285) plus interest through 
December 11, 2002 ($47,125) plus interest at the default 
rate of 30% through the date of entry of judgment ($221,773) 
equals $538,183. To this sum must be added the $69,528 in 
payments already made by DSI, making the total amount to be 
repaid by DSI to Cantamar $607,711. This exceeds the loan 
advances by $375,265, for an average annual interest rate of 
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about 35% from March 2002 through September 2005. 
In the Mattson case, one of the main reasons for 
finding no penalty was that actual damages exceeded interest 
charges by about 500%. 802 P.2d at 107. In the present 
case, the situation is the opposite: interest exceeds actual 
damages by 161%. 
Summary judgment should be reversed and the case 
remanded for trial. At trial, the court below should 
determine whether the interest charged in the Note 
represents a reasonable estimation of actual damages. To 
the extent the interest exceeds actual foreseeable damages, 
it should be treated as an unenforceable penalty. 
VI. 
THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED 
TO ALLOW THE COURT BELOW TO 
CONSIDER REFORMATION OF THE NOTE 
Courts have power in equity to reform contracts to 
correct mutual mistake, and in appropriate cases to correct 
a unilateral mistake as well. Guardian State Bank v. 
Stangl, 778 P.2d 1, 4-6 (Utah 1989). 
In the Guardian State case, the mistake was not a 
mutual mistake, but instead was a unilateral mistake. In 
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that case, the bank endorsed and delivered a promissory note 
without a restrictive endorsement. 778 P.2d at 2. Omitting 
the restrictive endorsement resulted in the bank losing the 
ability to collect on the note from a guarantor. Id., at 2-
3. The trial court ruled against the bank, holding that the 
bank's unilateral mistake in failing to add the restrictive 
endorsement did not provide a basis for relief. Id., at 3. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed, reformed the endorsement, 
and added the restriction. In doing so, the Court provided 
guidance appropriate for the present case: 
When one party's mistake of fact is coupled with 
knowledge of the mistake by the other party or a 
mistake is produced by fraud or other inequitable 
conduct by the nonerring party, the mistake 
provides a basis for reformation or rescission. 
Stangl, supra, 778 P.2d at 5 (emphasis added). 
The mistake by DSI in the present case is the same as 
the mistake by the bank in the Guardian State case: failing 
to include language in a note. This mistake resulted in an 
unfair outcome inconsistent with the parties' understanding. 
Thuett knew very well that the Note did not contain the 
agreement making payment conditional on an Investment. Yet, 
he did nothing to correct DSI's mistake. Now Cantamar wants 
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to take advantage of the omission despite the knowledge and 
active participation of its own agent (Thuett) in the 
failure. It would be inequitable to allow Cantamar to sweep 
its agent's promises under the rug and enforce the Note and 
its onerous interest rates. This case should be remanded so 
that the court below can consider all the evidence at trial 
in order to determine whether, in equity, DSI's mistake 
should be the basis for reforming the Note to conform to the 
actual intent of the parties. 
VII. 
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 
CANNOT BE USED TO PREVENT 
EQUITABLE REFORMATION 
The parol evidence rule does not apply in situations 
where reformation is appropriate: 
The right to reform is given, at least in part, so 
as to make the written instrument express the 
bargain the parties previously orally agreed upon. 
When a writing is reformed the result is that an 
oral agreement is by court decree made legally 
effective although at variance with the writings 
which the parties had agreed upon as a memorial of 
their bargain. The principle itself modifies the 
parol evidence rule. 
Sine v. Harper, 222 P.2d 571, 578 (Utah 1950) (emphasis 




CANTAMAR IS NOT ENTITLED 
TO ATTORNEYS FEES 
The court below awarded attorney's fees in the amount 
of $30,243.00, and costs of $1,373.87, to Cantamar. 
(Findings and Conclusions at 5, 57). 
The award of fees and costs to Cantamar was erroneous. 
It disregarded a fundamental rule of contract law: when one 
party to a valid contract commits an "uncured material 
failure" in its performance of the contract, the non-failing 
party is relieved of its duty to continue to perform under 
the contract." Aquagen International, Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 
972 P.2d 411, 414 (Utah 1998). 
In the present case, Cantamar has failed to perform an 
essential element of the Note, that is, to obtain an 
Investment for DSI. This failure was central to the 
performance of DSI pursuant to the terms of the Note, since 
it was understood and agreed that DSI would not have the 
capacity to pay pursuant to the terms of the Note without 
the Investment. (R. 65). 
Since Cantamar has failed to secure an Investment, it 
cannot enforce the terms of the Note, specifically its due 
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date, default interest rate, and amount. 
CONCLUSION 
DSI's parol evidence should not have been excluded. It 
was relevant and important in determining the meaning and 
character of the Note. Summary judgment must be reversed 
and the case remanded for trial. 
DATED this / ' ^ day of December, 2005. 
Chris L. Schmutz 
Schmutz & Mohlman 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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Suite 1400 
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On July 7,2005, hearing was held on Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 





Having reviewed the pleadings and affidavits filed by the parties, having heard the 
arguments of counsel for Plaintiff and Defendants, and pursuant to the Court's ruling made July 
7, 2003, the Court hereby enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law and order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant Data Systems International, Inc. (UDSF') made, executed and 
delivered to Cantamar, for valuable consideration, a Promissory Note ("Note"), dated January 
11, 2002, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A" to Cantamar's Complaint, in which 
defendant DSI promised to pay to Cantamar the sum of 5269,285.07 plus interest thereon at the 
rate of 8% per annum, prior to maturity, and at the rate of 30% per annum after maturity. 
2. The Note states that it is due and payable in full on May 11, 2002, as 
follows: 
The unpaid principal and accrued interest shall be payable in monthly 
installments of $1,795.23, beginning on February 11, 2002 and 
continuing until May 11, 2002 (the "Due Date") at which time the 
remaining unpaid principal and interest shall be due in full. 
3. On or about January 17, 2002, defendants Carlton J. Champagne and 
Lon E. Williams each made, executed and delivered to Cantamar their Guaranty (the 
"Guaranties"), included on page 3 of the Note, wherein defendants Carlton J. Champagne and 
Lon E. Williams guaranteed and promised to pay to Cantamar all indebtedness owed by DSI to 
Cantamar. 
4. DSI failed to pay the Note at maturity. 
? 
5. DSI has also failed to make monthly interest payments on the Note. DSI 
has not paid any interest on the Note since May, 2002. 
6. The amount owing on the Note is the principal sum, of $269,285.07 with 
accrued unpaid interest to and including December 11, 2002, of $47,124.89, all interest accruing 
thereafter on the impaid principal at the default rate of interest of 30% per annum until all such 
principal is paid in fall 
7. The Note was a refinance of prior obligations owed by DSI to Commercial 
Lending Group. Specifically, the Note refinanced outstanding obligations owed by DSI to 
Commercial Lending Group under a Promissory Note dated March 1, 2001 and a Promissory 
Note dated July 30, 2001. 
8. Actual cash advanced to DSI pursuant to these prior notes that were 
refinanced by the Note to Cantamar was $222,446.00. The remaining amounts included in the 
Note were unpaid fees and interest under the prior notes owed to Commercial Lending Group. 
9. Defendants allege that they entered into an oral agreement with Troy 
Thuett at the time the Note was signed that the Note would not be repaid until Troy Thuett 
obtained for DSI a $15 million investment. 
10. Defendants acknowledge that the Note clearly states the terms of 
repayment, but for the alleged oral agreement concerning the Due Date. 
U. The Note reflects monies borrowed by DSI? debt owed by DSI to 
Cantamar and is reflected on the books and records of DSI as an obligation owing to Cantamar. 
3 
12. Defendants also acknowledge that the Note evidences an obligation to 
make monthly interest payments. 
13. Defendants made four monthly payments of interest under the Note, for 
the months of February, March, April and May, 2002 and made no other interest payments due 
to alack of funds. 
14. Defendants' last contact with Troy Thuett in relation to pursuing the S15 
million investment for DSI was in early 2002. 
15. Defendants do not have any current expectation that Thuett will obtain this 
investment for DSI and defendants consider it a "dead deal." 
16. The interest rates stated in the Note were a substantial reduction of the 
interest rates on the notes owed by DSI to Commercial Lending Group that were refinanced by 
this Note, in that the prior notes bore interest at 72% per annum and 60% per annum (with the 
latter note providing for 120% per annum interest after default). 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. DSI is obligated as Maker of the Note. 
2. Defendants Carlton J. Champagne and Lon E. Williams are liable as 
guarantors of the Note. 
3. The Note is unambiguous. The Note clearly and unambiguously states 
that monthly interest payments are required of the maker. The Note clearly and unambiguously 
states that the entire unpaid balance of the Note is due and payable in full on May 11, 2002, the 
"Due Date." 
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4. The Note is an integrated agreement, as a matter of law. The language of 
the Note suggests that the Note is integrated in that it contains the elements expected to be 
contained in a Note, including stating the repayment terms. Nothing in the language of the Note 
suggests that anything is missing from the Note. The unambiguous statement in the Note of the 
amount and the due date further suggests that the Note is an integrated agreement. Defendants' 
alleged oral agreement is insufficient to overcome the presumption of integration. Defendants' 
alleged oral agreement is therefore barred by the parol evidence rule. 
5. Defendants' alleged condition precedent to the effectiveness of the Due 
Date has failed, making the Note due and payable in full. 
6. Defendant DSI is in default under the terms of the Note for failure to make 
interest payments and for failure to pay the balance of the Note on the Due Date of May 11, 
2002. 
7. Defendants are jointly and severally indebted to plaintiff in the principal 
amount of $269,285.07, plus interest thereon to and including December 11, 2002 in the amount 
of $47,124.89, plus further interest thereafter on the unpaid principal at the contract rate of 30% 
per annum, until paid; plus plaintiffs attorneys' fees incurred herein in the amount of 
$30,243.00, plus plaintiffs' costs of suit of S S ^ 4 & ^ ' /£2j& 
8. The attorneys' fees awarded to plaintiff herein are provided for by the 
Note and are reasonable and appropriate. 
5 
S4T 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs renewed motion for summary judgment is granted, there being no 
genuine issue as to any material fact, and plaintiff is granted summary judgment against 
defendants on plaintiff s First and Second Causes of Action. 
DATED this £ £ _ clay of. ^^/f 2 0 0 5 ' 
BYTHE\COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Chris L. Schmutz 
Attorney for Defendants 
tonorable Darwin C. Hansen 
district Court Judge 
" J* ^ ^ • L-V '^u.. .' ... .11* • . _ , \M&^M 
°~<?*,?A 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Benjamin R. MAGELSEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Randy FARNWORTH and Earl Loftus, dba Randy's 
Heating and Air Conditioning, 
Inc., Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 20030320-CA. 
April 21, 2005. 
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Laycock. 
Blake T. Ostler. Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Stephen Ouesenberry and J. Brvan Ouesenberry. Provo, for 
Appellees. 
Before Judges BENCH. JACKSON, and THORNE. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
THORNE. Judge: 
*1 Benjamin R. Magelsen sued Randy Farnworth and Earl 
Loftus, dba Randy's Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc. 
(collectively Randy's), for breach of contract arising out of 
the installation of a heating and air conditioning (HVAC) 
system in Magelsen's home. Following a bench trial, the 
trial court entered judgment in favor of Randy's. Magelsen 
appeals and we affirm. 
Magelsen first challenges the trial court's determination that 
a written contract between Magelsen and Randy's was not 
an integrated agreement. " 'An agreement is integrated 
where the parties thereto adopt a writing or writings as the 
final and complete expression of the agreement.' " Novell 
Inc. v. Canopy Group. Inc., 2004 UT App 162.f 10. 92 
P.3d 768 (quoting Eie v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 638 P.2d 
1190. 1194 (Utah 1981V). However, even though a writing 
appears to be integrated on its face, a court may still 
consider any relevant evidence, including parol evidence, to 
make its initial integration determination. See id. at Tf 11. 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No 
Page 1 
Here, the trial court was presented with two conflicting 
versions of the same written contract. The court properly 
determined that, at a minimum, parol evidence was 
necessary to resolve the conflict between the two 
documents. [FN1] However, the court was also presented 
with several other oral and written agreements between the 
parties pertaining to the HVAC installation. These other 
agreements occurred both before and after the execution of 
the written contract, and included an initial proposal and 
two postcontract change orders. In light of the evidence, the 
trial court appropriately viewed the written contract as one 
piece of the parties' ongoing and evolving agreement rather 
than as the "final and complete expression" of their intent. 
M a t 1J10. 
FN1. The court ultimately determined that the 
written agreement provided by Magelsen was 
fraudulently created. 
Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment 
awarding damages and attorney fees to Randy's. The trial 
court entered extensive factual findings in support of this 
judgment, particularly addressing the intent of the parties as 
regards their various agreements. Magelsen challenges 
several of the trial court's factual findings on the intent of 
the parties. 
" 'If a contract is not integrated or is ambiguous and the trial 
court finds facts regarding the parties' intent based on 
extrinsic evidence, we will not disturb the findings unless 
they are clearly erroneous.' " Fairbonrn Commercial Inc. v. 
American Hous. Partners. Inc.. 2003 UT App 98.^ 13. 68 
P.3d 1038 (quoting Schmidt v. Downs. 775 P.2d 427. 430 
(Utah Ct.App.1989)). affd, 2004 UT 54. 94 P.3d 292. To 
successfully challenge the trial court's factual findings, 
Magelsen "must marshal all relevant evidence presented at 
trial which tends to support the findings and demonstrate 
why the findings are clearly erroneous." Rappleye v. 
Rappleve. 2004 UT App 290.^ 27. 99 P.3d 348 (quotations 
and citation omitted), cert, denied, 106 P.3d 743 fUtah 
2004). 
Magelsen has failed to marshal the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings, and accordingly his challenge to 
those findings must fail. Further, the trial court made 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
WestJaw 
Not Reported in P.3d Page 2 
2005 WL 914186 (Utah App.), 2005 UT App ^ -
(Cite as: 2005 WL 914186 (Utah App.)) 
specific findings that Magelsen and his witnesses lacked 
credibility and that Magelsen submitted a fraudulent version 
of the parties' written contract to the court as evidence. 
Under these circumstances, we will presume that the trial 
court's factual findings are correct. 
*2 Magelsen also challenges the trial court's award of 
damages and attorney fees to Randy's, and its failure to 
award damages to him. The damages and attorney fees 
awards are adequately supported and justified by the trial 
court's factual findings, and Magelsen has presented no 
legal authority to the contrary. Rather, Magelsen's 
arguments regarding the awards implicitly attack the trial 
court's factual findings. As such, these arguments also fail 
for lack of marshaling. See id. 
The trial court: properly determined that the written 
agreement of the parties was not integrated and made 
extensive factual findings that support its judgment of 
damages and attorney fees in favor of Randy's. Accordingly, 
the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH. Associate 
Presiding Judge and NORMAN H. JACKSON. Judge. 
2005 WL 914186 (Utah App.), 2005 UT App 188 
ENDOFDOCI JMENT 
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BALLOON PA YMENT PROMISSORY NOTE 
$269,285.07 Date: January 11, 2002 
For value received, the undersigned Data Systems International (the "Borrower"), at 240 W. 200 
S. #105, P.O. Box 750, Farmington, Utah 84025, promises to pay to the order of The Cantamar 
LLC, (the "Lender"), at 1935 E. Deere Valley Dr., Layton, Utah 84040, (or at such other place as 
the Lender may designate in writing) the sum of $269,285.07 with interest from January 11. 
2002, on the unpaid principal at the rate of 8.00% per annum. 
Unpaid principal after the Due Date shown below shall accrue interest at a rate of 30.00% 
annually until paid. 
The unpaid principal and accrued interest shall be payable in monthly installments of $1,795.23, 
beginning on February 11, 2002, and continuing until May 11, 2002, (the "Due Date"), at which 
time the remaining unpaid principal and interest shall be due in full. 
THE BORROWER UNDERSTANDS THAT THE PAYMENT OF THE ABOVE 
INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS MAY NOT FULLY AMORTIZE THE PRINCIPAL BALANCE 
OF THE NOTE, AND THEREFORE, A BALLOON PAYMENT MAY BE DUE ON THE DUE 
DATE. 
All payments on this Note shall be applied first in payment of accrued interest and any remainder 
in payment of principal. 
The Borrower promises to pay a late charge of $250.00 for each installment that remains unpaid 
more than 10 day(s) after its Due Date. This late charge shall be paid as liquidated damages in 
lieu of actual damages, and not as a penalty. 
If any installment is not paid when due. the remaining unpaid principal balance and accrued 
interest shall become due immediately at the option of the Lender. 
The Borrower reserves the right to prepay this Note (in whole or in part) prior to the Due Date 
with no prepayment penalty. 
If any payment obligation under this Note is not paid when due, the Borrower promises to pay all 
costs of collection, including reasonable attorney fees, whether or not a lawsuit is commenced as 
part of the collection process. 
This Note is secured by a Accounts receivables in the form of future contracts from Ventura 
County, of which a minimum of 50% of the profits will be paid toward retirement of this loan. 
This loan will be paid from proceeds received from that contract and or other receivables of the 
company. In the case of new operating captial investments this loan will be retired upon the 
funding of the new loan., dated January 11, 2002. The Lender is not required to rely on the 
above security instrument and the assets secured therein for the payment of this Note in the case 
of default, but may proceed directly against the Borrower. 
If any of the following events of default occur, this Note and any other obligations J 
Borrower to the Lender, shall become di ic immediately, without demand or notice: 
1) the failure of the Borrower to pay the principal and any accrued interest in full on or 
before the Due Date; 
•i :he filing of bankruptcy proceedings involving the Borrower as a Debtor; 
nc application for the appointment of a receiver iur mc :;-.,rr\, wer; 
5 j the making of a general assignment for the benefit of the Borrower's creditors; 
6) the insolvency of the Borrower; 
7) a misrepresent.!!!"'1 ] ' « . 1 rmln - -' -rpose "' *f obtaining or 
extending credit. 
In addition, the Borrower shall be in default if there is a sale, transfer, assignment, or any other 
disposition of any assets pledged as security for the payment of this Note, or if there is a default 
in any security agreement which sea ires this Note, 
If any one or more of the provisions of this Note are determined to be unenforceable, in whole or 
in part, for any reason, the remaining provisions shall remain fully operative. 
iVll payments of principal and interest on this Note shall be paid in the legal currency of the 
United States. The Borrower waives presentment for payment, protest, and notice of protest and 
nonpayment of this Note, 
No renewal or extension of this Note, delay in enforcing any rig! it of the Lender under this Note, 
or assignment by Lender of this Note shall affect the liability or the obligations of the Borrower. 
All rights of the Lender under this Note are cumulative and may be exercised concurrently or 
consecutively at the Lender's option. 
This Note shall be construed in accordance witn :I:L i::v... v-i ;ne ^iaic ci _ ...::. 
Borrower: 
Data Systems International 
Carl Champa; 
GUARANTY 
Carl Champainge and Lon Williams both together and individually unconditionally guarantees 
all the obligations of the Borrower under this Note. 
Date ,Q*~ /7 f*> 
6/ 
Carl Champainge and Lon Williams both together and individually 
Carl Champairige and£#n Williams 
